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In the Utah Court of Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
VS. 
David Laird Hansen, 
Defendant, Appellant 
Case No. 920823-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-4-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
and Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Class A misdemeanor, in 
violation Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
and for a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-2-136, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. On November 15, 1991, 
defendant was committed to serve 30 days in jail due to his 
conviction of the above charges. On November 21, 1991, defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court issued an unsigned 
minute entry granting the motion and ordering the guilty verdict 
set aside. On January 30, 1992, the court found the defendant 
guilty on both counts. On March 25, 1992, defendant appeared for 
sentencing, and the court sentenced defendant in an unsigned order. 
On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the sentence. 
The court entered an unsigned order confirming the sentence and 
staying sentence for thirty days in case defendant wanted to 
appeal. The defendant filed his notice to appeal on May 8, 1992. 
Because the unsigned minute order did not constitute a final order, 
the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on September 15, 
1992. A second notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1992. 
Trial in this case was held on January 30, 1992. At the 
conclusion of the state's evidence, the defendant moved for a 
dismissal of both counts, arguing that the State had not met its 
burden to establish the corpus delicti of the crimes by 
independent, clear and convincing evidence prior to admitting the 
defendant's confession. The defendant had previously briefed the 
court on the corpus delicti issue. The court denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss and ruled that there was sufficient corroborating 
evidence to allow defendant's confession to be admitted. The court 
reasoned that the confession and the corroborating evidence could 
be taken together to establish the corpus delicti of the crime, 
thereby allowing the confession to be used for the further purpose 
of establishing identity of the criminal agent. The defendant then 
notified the court of his intent to appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. As a matter of law, should the trial court have invoked 
the corpus delicti rule to bar the use of defendant's confession in 
establishing that a crime had been committed? 
b. Did the State establish by independent, clear and 
convincing evidence that 1) The wrong specified occurred and 2) 
That the wrong specified was caused by someone's criminal behavior? 
Standard of Review: "Initially we note that trial court's 
2 
ruling that the corpus delicti rule does not bar admission of 
the statements is a question of law, and accordingly, our 
standard of review is correctness." State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A. There are no determinative constitutional provisions. 
B. Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
states as follows: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident 
resulting in injury to or death of any person shall 
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident 
or as close to it as possible and shall immediately 
return to and remain at the scene until he has fulfilled 
the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop may not 
obstruct traffic more than is necessary. 
(2) A person failing to stop of to comply with the 
requirements of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
C. Section 41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
states as follows: 
(1) a person whose license has been denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the 
laws of the state in which his license was issued and who 
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of the state 
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked shall be punished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of violation of Subsection (1), 
other than a violation specified in Subsection (3), is 
guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose 
conviction under subsection (1) is based on his operating 
a vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified, 
or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under 
section 41-6-44.10. 
D. Section 77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
states as follows: 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient 
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evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall 
forthwith order him discharged. 
E. Rule 17(o), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states as 
follows: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or 
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may 
issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, 
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence 
is not legally sufficient to establish the offense 
charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 
30, 1992, of leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving 
with a suspended license. Independent of Mr. Hansen's confession, 
the only evidence presented by the State showed that a single car 
rollover occurred on 1-15 North on September 7, 1991, that the car 
came to rest on the passenger side of the ar, that the only 
available exit from the car was the driver's door, that an 
unidentified man in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing 
up and out of that door, and that no witnesses could testify as to 
whether the man was the operator or the passenger. The same man 
went to a nearby grove of trees, then recrossed the highway and 
hitchhiked north. There was a second occupant in the car at the 
time of the accident and he was thrown from the vehicle and 
received mortal injuries to the head. 
Approximately 25 hours later police arrested David Laird 
Hansen, who was wearing clothes similar to those described by 
witnesses the day before. The State's witnesses did not identify 
Mr. Hansen as the person who exited the vehicle, beyond a general 
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description of his clothing and the fact that he had a small cut on 
his hand. Mr. Hansen was arrested after a car in which he was a 
passenger was pulled over on 1-15 more than 24 hours after the 
accident. During subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen 
stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the 
accident. 
Based on the foregoing facts, the defendant was convicted of 
leaving the scene of an accident and driving with a suspended 
license. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial judge should have granted his 
motion to dismiss based on the prosecution's failure to prove the 
corpus delicti of the crime by clear and convincing evidence, 
independent of the defendant's confession. The defendant further 
asserts that both offenses for which he was convicted contain a 
common essential element: The person charged must proven to be the 
operator of the vehicle. The facts of this case are such that, 
absent Mr. Hansen's confession, the state offered no proof that Mr. 
Hansen was the "operator" of the vehicle. The State's evidence 
(Trial Transcript P.26) 
tends only to show that someone wearing a blue jacket and red shirt 
exited the car after the accident and then left the scene. If that 
person was not the operator, there is no crime. Without clear and 
convincing evidence that it was the operator of the vehicle that 
left the scene, no corpus delicti of the crimes can be established 
sufficient to admit Mr. Hansen's confession into evidence for the 
purpose of establishing guilt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS BASED ON PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE 
CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANT'S 
CONFESSION. 
At the end of the prosecution's evidence, counsel for the 
defendant moved for a dismissal. The motion was based on the 
defendant's claim that the prosecution had failed to establish the 
corpus delicti of the crime before introducing defendant's 
confession, and that without the confession, the State had no proof 
that a wrong had been committed. 
The corpus delicti rule has recently been restated and 
clarified by the Utah Supreme Court. "Corpus delicti must be 
established through evidence, independent of the confession or 
admission, that the * injury specified .... occurred, and that such 
injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct'." State v. 
Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. 
Knoefler, 563 P. 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977)). The Court examined the 
development of Utah's corpus delicti case law and found that State 
v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954), "stated the applicable standard 
and required a finding of clear and convincing evidence of corpus 
delicti... In summary, our review of post-Ferry cases does not 
convince us that the court has moved away from the Ferry clear and 
convincing evidence standard." Johnson, at 1163. 
The Johnson rule puts three requirements on the state for 
establishing the corpus delicti of the crime: 
1. The state must prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong or 
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injury; 
2. The state must prove that the crime, wrong or injury was 
caused by someone's criminal conduct; and 
3. The evidence must be clear and convincing, and independent of 
the defendant's confession. 
The state's or il y "i ndependent" evidence that even tends to 
implicate Mr. Hansen as the operator of vehicle was the testimony 
of Mr. Forman that he saw someone exit by the only available door, 
which coincidentally was * - driver's dooi . Npit-hPi Hi . McGhie nor 
Mr. Forman ever saw the operator of the car; neither testified that 
Mr Hansen was the operator. Neither witness could even identify 
Mr. Hansen as the mat i tl lat exited the car, despite testifying that 
he passed in front of them at a distance of no more than thirty 
feet (30'). 
Based on the State's Independei - i 1 ^ * is just as likely 
that the victim of the accident was the driver as that Mr. Hansen 
was the driver. The car rolled one and one quarter (1 1/4) times, 
which could easily have throw i i, tl: le dri ver f::i : om the c ar and J eft the 
passenger inside. In addition, the car belonged to the accident 
victim, Mr. Mower. A logical inference is that the most likely 
person t : be drivi ng w o u M invi nocm t lit. < .tt i, iiwiiMf 
The statutes charging the defendant with leaving the scene of 
an accident and driving under a suspended license both require as 
an element of the crime tl: lat the person ct larged 1 : •€ • t l le "operator11 
of the vehicle. If the state cannot present independent, clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Hansen was driving the car, no corpus 
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delicti has been established that would allow the introduction of 
the defendant's confession. The state did not present any such 
evidence. 
In State v. Strieby. 790 P.2d 98 (Utah App. 1990), the Court 
held that, 
"The interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1982) 
and Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(o) (1982)) requires a trial 
judge to grant a motion for judgement of acquittal when 
the prosecution fails to present enough believable 
evidence to put the defendant to her defense. State v. 
Smith. 675 P. 2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). The state is 
required to show some evidence of every element of its 
cause of actionf or a lesser included offense, to avoid 
an unfavorable directed verdict at the close of its case 
in chief." (emphasis added) 
Without some clear and convincing evidence placing Mr. Hansen 
behind the wheel at the time of the accident, the state has neither 
proven the occurrence of a crime nor criminal conduct on the part 
of Mr. Hansen. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven by 
independent, clear and convincing evidence and the trial court 
should not have allowed Mr. Hansen's confession to be used to 
establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The tr i^ i court should 
have granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. THE PROSECUTION PRODUCED NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS THE OPERATOR OF THE VEHICLE, WHICH IS AN 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION. 
For Leaving the Scene of an Accident the elements of the cause 
of action are: 
1. The OPERATOR of a vehicle involved in an injury accident will, 
2. stop the vehicle at the scene, and 
3. remain at the scene and fulfill the requirements of § 41-6-31. 
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For driving with a suspended license the elements of the cause 
of action are: 
1. A person whose license is suspended, 
2. OPERATES a vehicle on the highways, 
3. while that license is suspended. 
The Deputy Utah Coui it} Attorney, i n her "'Response to 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points & Authorities re Corpus Delicti" 
dated May 5th, 1992 stated at page 6, "The only element for which 
the confession was helpi . defendar identity as the 
driver/operator of the vehicle involved in the accident." The 
defendant wholeheartedly agrees with the County Attorney that the 
confession is the only evidence the State I las :>f t ..he most essential 
element of the cause of action: That Mr. Hansen was the OPERATOR 
of the vehicle. 
The State cannot charge • passenger with leaving the scene of 
an accident, nor with operating a vehicle under a suspended 
license. The burden is on the state to prove that a crime was 
committed before introducing a defendant's confession to establish 
his guilt The only way to prove that the victim was not the 
operator is to introduce the confession, which is barred until the 
state proves a crime was committed. similar 
failure to establish corpus delicti, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
stated that "Our traditional zeal in safeguarding the rights of an 
accused would preclude convictio. . .anc.jl basis.11 
State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954). 
IiI Ferry the defendant was charged with unlawful carnal 
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knowledge. A deputy sheriff testified that the defendant answered 
"yes" when the girl involved had asked defendant if it were right 
that they have sexual relations. Neither the defendant nor the 
girl testified at the trial. The Court wrote that: 
"The only independent evidence which might tend to 
establish a corpus delicti and lend credence to the 
confession here, is the testimony of the deputy, the 
substance of which, at best, was the statement of a 
person that refused to appear and subject herself to 
cross-examination, thus precluding the test of any truth 
of the statement purportedly made or the veracity of the 
one who made it. Such hearsay, even though admissible... 
in our opinion falls far short of the quantum and quality 
of independent evidence which the authorities require in 
proving the corpus delicti before a confession may be 
used to establish guilt." 
The above quote reflects directly on the core problem with the 
case at bar. The only clear and convincing evidence that the state 
offered at trial to prove that Mr. Hansen was the operator of the 
vehicle was the Highway Patrolman's testimony as to the confession. 
Because Mr. Hansen is not required to take the stand and undergo 
cross-examination, the confession is not subject to verification of 
veracity, creating the danger of conviction on a false confession. 
It is for this very reason that conviction is not allowed on a 
defendant's confession without clear and convincing evidence that 
a crime has been committed and that the crime was the result of 
criminal behavior. 
III. THE EVIDENCE IN THE PRESENT CASE DOES NOT RISE TO THE 
LEVEL REQUIRED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN PREVIOUS 
CORPUS DELICTI CASES. 
In other cases involving the corpus delicti rule, the Utah 
Supreme Court has required a showing of substantial evidence that 
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a crime has been committed before the defendant's confession could 
be admitted for purposes of identity. The evidence in the case at 
hand does not rise to the level required a corpus delicti. 
In State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977), the court 
allowed the admissions of the defendant to be entered only because 
the independent evidence was so substantial that the trier of fact 
could hardly have entertained any doubt as to who was driving the 
vehicle. The evidence showed that although there was nobody under 
the wheel of the defendant's ti passenger • : i tl: le Dther =;1 < ie 
of the front seat was bleeding heavily and there were pools of 
blood on that side of the truck. 
The passenger door was damaged -HM! W U U M nut upwn, the trui.K 
had not rolled, and the driver was questioned while still at the 
scene of the accident. "Had the other person in the truck been 
driving, it is obvious that the appellaul wuul 1 have found it 
necessary to exchange place^^with 1liin since the right hand door 
could not be opened. And since there was no blood on the driver's 
side and none on the appellant- it would strai i i tl n = cre< ii i ] :i try : i: < i 
juror to have any doubt as to who was the driver." Id. at 1062-63. 
As a result of that finding, the court allowed the defendant's 
confession to be admitted. 
The disparity between the evidence in Anderson and the present 
case is very revealing. In the case at bar nobody remained in the 
car, making it impossible to determine who w.i;>, the iJnver. Mr. 
Hansen was not identified at the scene by police or any other 
witnesses and was not arrested or questioned until twenty six hours 
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later. 
The car had also rolled and landed on its side, further 
(Trial Transcript P. 36) 
diluting any inference that a person seen leaving by the only 
available door was the driver. The prosecution also attempted to 
elicit testimony from Officer Macaphie to indicate whether any 
(Trial Transcript P. 38) 
blood was found inside the passenger side of the car. No blood was 
found inside on the passenger side. The only blood found was on 
the ground where Mr. Mower, the victim, had been thrown from the 
car. The facts of the present case are so readily distinguishable 
from Anderson that is logical to infer that the evidence against 
Mr. Hansen does not rise to required level to establish the corpus 
delicti. 
Another case that illustrates the quantum and quality of 
evidence necessary to establish corpus delicti is State v. Cooleyr 
603 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). The defendant was convicted of forcible 
sexual abuse. He appealed, based partly on his claim that the 
state had not proven corpus delicti before admitting his 
inculpatory confession. The Supreme Court held that the testimony 
of the victim's father that he saw the defendant with his hands on 
the victim's panties satisfied the requirement for proving corpus 
delicti. Cooley is distinguishable from the current case because 
there is no direct testimonial evidence placing Mr. Hansen under 
the wheel driving the car. Therefore, the State is relying 
solely on Mr. Hansen's post-crime confession to establish that the 
person who left the scene was the operator of the car. Without 
that confession there is no evidence that either of the "operator" 
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offenses complained of actually occurred. 
Requiring this level of evidence does not mean that the State 
can never convict a criminal with* r * less. What it means 
is that the quantum and quality of corroborating evidence must be 
clear and convincing enough to establish the commission of a crime, 
independent iI i defendant's confession. This is sound public 
policy because it protects people who feel pressured into a 
confession, those who make false admissions, from being 
convicted without the requisite - -i rime ar »f 
criminal behavior. 
The unsettling complication in this case is inherent to a 
narrow group of limited crimes that reijutii" identification of the 
criminal agent as an element of the cause of action. Therefore, a 
finding of no corpus delicti and a reversal of the trial court 
would properly be limited to that narrow qiuup uf crimes. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the existence of 
such a group of crimes and enunciated a more protective corpus 
delicti rule to deal with them. 
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154, 99 L.ed. 192, 
199, 75 S. Ct. 194 (1954), the Court addressed the corpus delicti 
rule in the context of a tax fraud case wtiet H tiii- identify ot Hie 
taxpayer was an element of the cause of action. The Court 
recognized that: 
"as to this crime, it cannot be shown that the crime has 
been committed without identifying the accused. Thus we 
are faced with the choice of either applying the 
corroboration rule to this offense and according the 
accused even greater protection than the rule affords to 
a defendant in a homicide prosecution, (string cite 
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omitted), or of finding the rule wholly inapplicable 
because of the nature of the offense, stripping the 
accused of this guarantee altogether. We choose to apply 
the rule, with its broader guarantee, to crimes .... 
where the corroborative evidence must implicate the 
accused in order to show that a crime has been 
committed." Smith, 99 L.ed. 192, 199. 
The case at bar is a crime where the "corroborative evidence 
must implicate the accused" as the operator of the vehicle or the 
charges cannot stand. Independent of the defendant's inculpatory 
statements, the State's evidence only showed that a man, who was 
equally likely to have been the passenger as the driver, exited the 
vehicle and left the scene. Other than the post-arrest 
admissions, the only evidence that tends to indicate Mr. Hansen was 
the other occupant of the vehicle is a general description of the 
clothing worn by the second occupant of the car. However, the 
evidence has a rather stale connection to Mr. Hansen, considering 
that absent his confession, Mr. Hansen was not identified as 
wearing similar clothing until more than a day later. And because 
Utah is a state where many people dress "western style", it is not 
unlikely that any number of men on 1-15 each day are wearing red 
plaid shirts and blue denim jackets. 
It is evident from the trial record that the judge recognized 
Mr. Hansen's unique dilemma in seeking the protection of the corpus 
delicti guarantee in this case. The judge noted that the question 
of the operator and the identity of the person committing the 
offense must be answered the same in order to convict. Despite 
that realization, the trial court chose to admit the confession for 
purposes of identifying the operator. The court stated that 
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sufficient corroborating evidence had been presented and that the 
confession is what "makes the difference." Trial Transcript at pg. 
60. 
The only corroborating evidence presented at trial, other than 
the confession, merely tended to put someone in the car who was 
wearing clothes similar to clothes worn by Mr. Hansen the next day. 
The evidence did not in any way indicate that the similarly dressed 
person was the operator of the car. From the evidence presented, 
it is just as likely that the person was the passenger, and 
perhaps more likely considering that the victim was the owner of 
the car. 
The admission of the confession was therefore error, because 
each element of the corpus delicti, including the element of the 
identity of the operator, must be established by independent, clear 
and convincing evidence before a post-arrest confession can be 
entered as evidence of guilt. The trial court should have applied 
the Smith rule, with its broader protections for this narrow 
criminal context. By not applying the Smith rule, the trial court 
accomplished precisely what the Smith Court decided should be 
avoided in these cases: The defendant received diminished 
protection under the corpus delicti guarantee. Such a result 
oriented decision should be reversed and its lower standard 
denounced as wholly unacceptable. 
To reverse the trial court's judgement would be in keeping 
with the Utah Supreme Court's direction that "in deference to the 
time honored and important precept of our law that it is better 
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that ten guilty go free, than one innocent be punished, we feel 
there is wisdom in requiring proof of corpus delicti independent of 
a confession as a precaution against convicting the innocent..." 
State v. Weldonr 314 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1957). 
CONCLUSION 
The corpus delicti rule imparts to the State the burden of 
proving, independent of a defendant's confession, that 1) A wrong 
or injury was done, and 2) That the wrong or injury was the result 
of someone's criminal behavior. When the identity of the 
defendant is a necessary element of the crime which the State seeks 
to prove, the Smith rule from the United States Supreme Court 
should afford broader protection to the defendant than the normal 
corpus delicti guarantee. Smith requires that the prosecution 
prove the identity element of the crime by clear and convincing 
means other than the defendant's own confession. The State has not 
met that burden. The investigation into the identity of the 
vehicle's operator apparently stopped with the confession of Mr. 
Hansen, a prosecutorial practice that could erode the protection 
afforded to the common man against conviction on a false 
confession. Based on the foregoing facts, the Defendant 
respectfully urges this Court to reverse the above convictions in 
this case and dismiss this case with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this _ *> day of February, 1993. 
& 
CLEVE J. HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
16 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to Utah County Attorney, Claudia Laycock, 
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606 this ^ y day of 
February, 1993. 
CLEVE J. HATCH 
ELKINS & ASSOCIATES 
60 East 100 South, Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 374-1212 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case Number 920823-CA 
Priority #2 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
The following documents are submitted as an addendum to Appelant7s 
brief herein: 
1. Judgment and Sentence entered into on October 28, 1992. 
2. Response to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
RE Corpus Delecti filed by the Utah County Atorney on May 5, 
1992. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, ) 
Defendant. ) 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. 911001003 
APPEARANCES: Claudia Laycock, Deputy County Attorney 
Defendant present with Cleve Hatch as Counsel 
On the basis of Non-Jury Trial verdict of Guilty on 1-30-92 
defendant was convicted of the offense of: 
COUNT I: LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT, a Class A 
Misdemeanor; and 
COUNT II: DRIVING ON SUSPENSION, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
No Legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, the Court now adjudges the above defendant guilty of 
said offense and sentences defendant as follows: 
The defendant is sentenced to serve 1 year in the Utah County 
Jail on Count I and to serve 6 months on Count II. 
The sentence is stayed pending a review on May 6, 1992, at 10:00 
a.m. 
DATED: October 28, 1992 
BY THE COURT: 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
J^Js^ K/C-e-sr"- '^N^UYVVV^ H, AMI 
DGE \\ - •>* 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
vs. 
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN, Case No. 911001003 
Defendant. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
with postage thereon prepaid on this 28th day of October 
1992 to the following interested parties, at the addresses 
indicated below, to-wit: 
Claudia Laycock, 100 E. Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606 
Cleve Hatch 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601 
Karen D. Hansen 
Assistant Clerk of Court 
KAY BRYSONf #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, #0473 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAHf 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 




Case No. 911001003 
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN, : 
Defendant(s). 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff through its counsel, Claudia 
Laycock, Deputy Utah County Attorney, and submits the following 
Answer to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities on 
Corpus Delicti. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, David Laird Hansen was tried to the bench, 
Judge Robert Sumsion residing, on January 30, 1992. On September 
7, 19 91 two gentlemen, Jerry McGhie and Robert Foreman, were 
standing in front of the Lone Peak Trailers sales lot, which is 
located on the frontage road west of 1-15 and just north of the 
Alpine exit in northern Utah County, when they heard the sound of 
a car crashing at approximately 2:50pm. Mr. McGhie testified 
that he first saw a man come across the south bound lanes of 1-15 
running towards a group of trees. When he first noticed this man 
running, the man had just barely left the center median of the 
freeway. He watched him jump the fence at the edge of the freeway 
to get to the frontage road. Mr. McGhie went into the office of 
the business establishment and called 911 for help. After he 
returned to the sales lot he asked Mr. Foreman what had happened 
to the man from the car. He then saw the same man pass in front 
of him running north. This same man crossed back over to the 
north bound side of 1-15 and began hitchhiking about a half block 
north of the accident. He observed as a car stopped and picked 
up this man. The man was wearing a Levi-type jacket with a red 
shirt that was hanging out. The vehicle which had crashed was 
resting on its passenger side. 
Mr. Foreman testified that he saw a man climb out of the 
driver's side of the vehicle, which was resting on its passenger 
side. The man then ran west to the frontage road and jumped the 
fence and hid by a group of trees. Soon after, the same man ran 
past him and Mr. Foreman smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming 
from the running man. The man then went further north and 
crossed 1-15 and started hitchhiking northbound on the freeway. 
He did not observe the man as he was able to get ride. He 
described the man as wearing a blue Levi jacket and reddish shirt 
that was hanging out. He also stated that the man had blood on 
his right hand. He was very certain that it was the same man who 
went into the trees who came out. 
Trooper Mike Rees of the Utah Highway Patrol was called to 
the scene and arrived as the first officer on the scene. He 
found a victim of the one-car accident lying close to the car. 
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By that time, the car had been rolled back to its wheels by 
observers who trying to help the victim of the accident. Trooper 
Lynn McAfee, also of the Utah Highway Patrol, was called out to 
the scene of this accident. He was then dispatched to the 
American Fork Hospital and there was informed by the doctor the 
victim had died. He interviewed the defendant, David Laird 
Hansen, the next day, September 8, 1991. After advising the 
defendant of this Miranda rights, Trooper McAfee interviewed the 
defendant, who admitted to the officer that he was the driver of 
the vehicle involved in this accident, and that he had run 
because he was scared. He claimed that he had been on his way to 
Orem to contact the police regarding this accident when he was 
arrested. He further said victim had been very drunk and had 
grabbed the steering wheel. He also claimed that he, Mr. Hansen, 
had overcorrected when the pulled the wlieel back and that he then 
lost control of the vehicle. Trooper McAfee described the 
defendant's clothes at the time of the arrest as levis, a red 
plaid shirt, and a blue levi jacket. The defendant also had 
small cuts one hand. 
After hearing all evidence, the defendant was found guilty 
on both counts by Judge Sumsion. 
QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT 
Did the State fulfill the requirements of the doctrine of 
corpus delicti before it introduced the confession of the 
defendant, David Laird Hansen? 
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CORPUS DELICTI CASE LAW IN UTAH 
According to the recent case of State v. Johnson, 173 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 11 (1991), "Under the Utah corpus delicti rule, 
before postcrime inculpatory statements are admissible, the State 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong was 
done and (ii) such wrong was the result of criminal conduct." 
This coincides with the rule stated in State v. Rebeterano, 681 
P2d 1265 (Utah 1984), which defendant's counsel quotes in his 
Memorandum. "The state has the burden of proving the corpus 
delicti of a crime, i.e., that the injury specified in the crime 
occurred, and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal 
conduct." IdL_ at 1267, quoting State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 
176 (1977). 
The corpus delicti rule also states that, before a 
defendant's confession can be introduced as evidence, the State 
must prove the occurrence of a crime. Although "corpus delicti 
must be established through evidence independent of the 
confession or admission . . . (u)nder our prior cases, the State 
is not required to show independent evidence 'that the accused 
was the guilty agent.'" State v. Johnson at 9. 
According to State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (1977), 
the requirement of independent proof demands only that the State 
present evidence that the injury specified in the crime occurred, 
and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct. 
An admission or confession is admissible to connect an accused 
with the crime committed; but the connection of the accused with 
the crime need not be proved to establish the corpus delicti." 
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In other words, there is no law which requires the State to prove 
the identity of the "wrongdoer" before presenting the confession 
into evidence. 
In an earlier case, State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 
(1938), which is still adhered to by the Utah courts (see State 
v. Johnson, supra at 9), the court explains that a criminal case 
requires the State to prove three facts before it is entitled to 
go to the jury or have a verdict in its favor. These "facts are: 
(1) a wrong, an injury, or a damage has been done; (2) that such 
was effected by a criminal agency: i.e., without right or by 
unlawful means; (3) that the accused perpetrated the wrong, or 
aided or abetted therein, i.e., that the accused was the guilty 
agent." The court further reveals that a confession "serves as 
evidence, and if believed, as sufficient proof of the third point 
of proof, the identity of the guilty agent. It may also . . . be 
evidence of either or both of the first and the second points to 
be proved. (However) there must be independent evidence of the 
first and second points, commonly called the corpus delicti." 
This points out that the third test is separate from the first 
two and is not necessary to prove the requisite corpus delicti. 
ARGUMENT 
Substantial and persuasive evidence was adduced at trial 
to show that there had been a wrong or injury or damage committed 
and that such had been effected by criminal agency (unlawful 
means). The two witnesses standing at the sales lot of the 
trailer sales establishment both saw the defendant coming from 
the location of the single-vehicle accident. Mr. Foreman 
- 5 -
testified more specifically that he saw a man climb out of the 
driver's side of the vehicle. Both witnesses saw this same man 
run to the side of the road, run past them at the trailer sales 
lot, cross back over the road, and start hitchhiking. Mr. McGhie 
even saw this same man get into a car and continue north in that 
vehicle. There was a person injured in the vehicle, who was not 
the defendant. 
The only element for which the confession was helpful was 
the defendant's identity as the driver/operator of the vehicle 
involved in the accident. There was sufficient collaborating 
evidence testified to at trial to allow the introduction of the 
defendant's confession to Trooper McAfee. The defendant was seen 
climbing out of the driver's side of the vehicle, while the 
injured person was found close the passengers side of the 
vehicle. The defendant's actions in immediately leaving the 
scene, rather than staying to see to the safety of the other 
injured person, also corroborated his involvement in the accident 
and his concern over facing the consequences of that accident. 
These actions were consistent with those of the operator of a 
vehicle who was concerned about his culpability in the accident. 
Such concerns would not be shared by a passenger. 
The corpus delicti was adequately dealt with by the State 
before the introduction of the defendant's confession. The 
defendant's confession merely served to corroborated those facts 
that were already before the Court and to more conclusively 
establish just one element of the crime of leaving the scene of 
an injury accident. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully urges this Court to deny 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss. This Court did not err in 
admitting the defendant's confession into evidence, 
DATED this c5^v_day of May, 1992. 
Claudia Laycock 
Deputy Utah County attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Defendant's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities re Corpus Delicti to Public Defender, 
40 South 100 West, Ste 200, Provo, Utah 84601 this S"sH^_^day of 
, 1992. 
XAA^A^C^^ 
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